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CANADIAN & AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: 
< 
COMPETITORS? COOPERATORS? ·OR BOTH? 
! 
By Dr. Clayton Yeutter* 
It is a pleasure for me to be in Toronto, for the first time 
ever. My wife and I honeymooned in Canada 30 years ago, so every 
return trip to your beautiful country is a nostalgic experience. 
Wi th an 80 cent exchange rate, we really ought to come back for 
another honeymoon in June and stay the rest of the year! 
Marshall Loeb, one of our outstanding business journalists, 
delivered a speech a couple of years ago in which he predicted the 
winning nations in international economic competition for the next 
decade or two. His top category encompassed only five nations and 
Canada was one of them. Fort unately, so was the Uni ted States. 
Of even more relevance to the audience assembled here today, 
agricultural productivity was delineated by Mr. Loeb as one of the 
primary reasons for his prediction in both your case and ours. 
Mr. Loeb could be wrong, of course, but I doubt it. I concur 
with his assessment that the long term outlook for both Canadian 
and American agricultural producers is optimistic. Furthermore, 
if that optimistic result is not realized, it will probably be our 
own faul t. That is, it will likely be because we have "shot 
*President and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange; former Deputy Special Trade Representative and former 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. 
ourselves in the foot" again through unwise governmental policies. 
The short run, however, comes first, and it is not qui te so 
optimistic. Net farm incomes have plummeted in the United States 
in recent years, and Canadian agriculture has not been in a 
euphoric economic state either. What happened to all those 
beautiful dreams of the 1970s? 
The Glut 
One really should analyze all sectors of our respective 
agricul tural economies, but there is no time for that. So please 
permit me to concentrate primarily on cereals, where both Canada 
and the U. S. have an intense international interest and 
involvement. Much of what can be said about cereals, however, is 
also applicable to many other farm products. 
First of all, one must simply concede that we have a glut in 
suppl ies, and one of such magni tude that it will not quickly go 
away. The reasons are not diff icul t to discern. We have had 
generally good growing conditions in the U.S. and most other major 
producing areas (Australia being the obvious exception) in recent 
years. That alone would be troublesome, but when coupled wi th 
adverse developments on the demand side, the price result is 
devastating. 
As exporters, both our countries have recently had to battle 
the effects of a global recession, accompanied by an enormous 
transfer of wealth from some of our best customers to the OPEC 
cartel, which contains good customers but not populous ones. This 
has left many agricul tural importing nations strapped for money, 
victims of a cash flow crunch and an enormous debt burden. 
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The strong dollar has not helped either. It is not easy to 
explain to an American farmer why his grain costs more in the 
international marketplace than it did three or four years ago when 
he has seen his own selling price decline dramatically. A 
discussion of international monetary policy and the merits of 
floating exchanges rates is not likely to impress the farmer whose 
net worth has suddenly disappeared even though he is as efficient 
an operator as he ever was. And certainly our grain embargo did 
not help the American exporting cause, though it had short range 
"windfall" benefits to Canada and other export competitors. 
In summary, the '80s have thus far been traumatic for Canadian 
and American agriculture, exciting but not very profitable. Which 
brings on the more relevant question - what do we do about it? 
Export Demand 
Let's look at the demand side first, simply because that is 
more appealing. As between increasing demand or reducing output, I 
much prefer the former. So do American farmers, and I suspect 
Canadian producers are no different. Farmers enjoy going all out 
to help feed the world, a psychologically and financially rewarding 
experience if the demand is there. 
The key element in this picture is the one recognized by your 
conference planners recovery. Since that issue has been 
thoroughly discussed today, I will not now impose further 
analytical comments on you. Suffice it to say that the U.S. 
recovery is well underway, and will surely continue if we do not 
botch either our fiscal or monetary policy decisions. My personal 
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judgment is that we will do reasonably well in that process, and 
that the U. S. will experience a heal thy recovery over the next 
several years. If so, the Canadian economy will benefit too, as 
will all our other major trading partners. 
Some caveats are in order, however. One relates to the 
credit crisis. Over the past decade or so, the greatest growth in 
our agricultural exports has come from sales to the stronger 
members of the group of lesser developed nations. I expect that 
trend to continue, and I imagine it will affect Canadian 
agricul tural exporters in essentially the same way. In other 
words, we both need to expand our embryonic LDC markets. (Some 
are already so large that they can no longer be considered 
embryonic. ) Right now I however, that can only be done through 
credit provided by someone the World Bank, the IMP, the 
commercial banking system, and our respective government credit 
programs. Credit availability is the front burner problem for 
LDC's today, and it is a high priority issue for us too. Unless 
that credit materializes, many of the lesser developed countries 
will not be able to survive financially, let alone contemplate an 
expansion of their food imports. This is one of the most critical 
issues facing the Western World in 1983, and one which must be 
confronted decisively in the coming weeks. 
Please understand that I am not suggesting credit competition 
between Canada and the United States, or between and among any of 
the developed nations. Subsidized interest rates by countries 
I ike ours make no sense at all, other than in a foreign aid 
context. They should not be an element of commercial competition 
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between us, and our respective governments should seek diligently 
to avoid that result. Unfortunately, the world of export credits 
is still an imperfect one, and none of us can take pride in the 
limited progress that has been made. 
Our LDC customers are desperate for credit at any cost. 
Consequently, some exporters may seek to take advantage of their 
plight. I hope Canada and the u.s. will not be in that category. 
It is imperative that creditors demonstrate a great deal of 
patience and tolerance during these trying times. Unless that 
occurs, major elements of the international monetary system could 
easily collapse, in which case Canada and the u.s. would both sell 
a whole lot less grain. 
My second caveat relates to protectionism. When the economic 
going gets tough, the natural inclination of all countries is to 
reduce imports. Unfortunately, that can be counterproductive in 
many ways, and it is assuredly counterproductive for one's export 
industries. If imports are reduced through government edict, 
"voluntary" restraint programs, or other means, global trade will 
decl ine, and exports must ul timately shrink as well. This is a 
vicious cycle destined to exascerbate global economic conditions, 
and doomed to worsen most everyone's level of living. It is a 
foolish policy, but one which is politically very difficult to 
resist. 
The dangers of protectionism were articulated well this past 
week by Brazilian Finance Minister Delfim Netto in a speech to the 
Chicago World Trade Conference. The Minister, who has the 
enviable task of presiding over one of the world's largest inter-
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national debt burdens, pointed out that lenders today want 
everybody to expand exports 
impossible in a global context. 
and limit imports. But that is 
Delfim Netto went on to point out 
that even developed nations such as the u.s. see export expansion 
as a parameter of economic recovery, while they simultaneously seek 
ways to protect uncompetitive industries from foreign competition. 
"How can Brazil be expected to payoff its debts," said Delfim 
Netto, "if countries like yours are unwilling to further open your 
markets to us. You leave us in a Catch 22 situation with no hope." 
We would all do well to heed the Minister's warnings. 
A third caveat relates to agricul tural export subsidies, an 
area in which Canada and the u.s. have a common problem with the 
European Economic Community and, at times, other nations as well. A 
global economic recovery will not restore the health of our 
respective agricultural export sectors if their sales efforts are 
undercut by subsidized competition. As you probably know, the EEC 
is spending nearly $8 billion per year on agricultural export 
subsidies, and the Community has now become one of the world's 
major exporters of farm products. In the absence of export 
subsidies, that clearly would not have occurred. EEC subsidy 
practices are wreaking havoc in traditional Canadian and American 
export markets nearly every day of the year. Our farmers, through 
their export firms, and your farmers through Canadian export 
agencies, simply cannot be expected to compete with the EEC 
treasury. 
It is imperative that we work together to bring some sense and 
rationality to the export subsidy picture. GATT rules in this 
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area are grossly inadequate. The export subsidy code negotiated in 
the Tokyo Round has major shortcomings and will have to be amended 
if we are to avoid a subsidy war among agricultural exporters. 
One could easily extend that concern to other agricultural 
trade issues as well. We have shunted them to the sidelines in far 
too many rounds of GATT negotiations, giving free or fair trade in 
farm products lip service at best. We no longer have that luxurYi 
we are now paying the price for past procrastination in confronting 
these complex and pol i tically volatile issues. Confront them we 
must or the GATT will lose any influence that it has in the 
agricultural arena, and trading nations such as ours will be forced 
to unilaterally defend their own interests. That is precisely what 
occurred in the recent U.8. sale of wheat flour to Egypt. Unless 
the EEC and other "subsidizers" evidence a willingness to bring 
some sanity to agricultural trade, the wheat flour sale will likely 
be a precursor of things to come. 
On the demand side, a word should also be said about market 
development. Agricultural exports came easily, for you and for us, 
in the 1970s. They have not corne so easily since the onslaught of 
the worldwide recession, and they will probably never come as 
easily again. Dr. D. Gale Johnson, an eminent agricultural 
economist at the University of Chicago, believes that demand for 
U. 8. ag exports will grow much more slowly during the 1980s than 
during the 19708. He cites a host of very persuasive reasons for 
reaching this conclusion. I f Prof. Johnson is correct, we both 
have our market development work cut out for us. 
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It is not an impossible task~ the potential is there. Neither 
is it an unpleasant task, for working with other cultures is a self 
satisfying experience. Nor is it unrewarding, for every additional 
export sale means more jobs and higher farm and agribusiness incomes 
in Canada and the United States. But market development requires 
skill, persistence, determination, and a long term commitment of 
resources. 
Neither of us is doing this job as well as we should. Nor are 
we placing the emphasis on high value agricultural exports that we 
should be. Of the $230 billion in world agricultural t~ade at the 
beginning of this decade, only $120 billion was in high value 
products (semi-processed, such as meat, flour, and oilseeds: highly 
processed, such as dairy products; or high value unprocessed, such 
as fruits and vegetables). And we in the U.S. had only 10% of that 
lucrative high value market, as compared to 30% for lower value, 
unprocessed products such as grains. If the U.S. could capture 20% 
of the high value market in this decade, it would add immeasurably 
to our farm export values even if tonnage were to increase only 
modestly as predicted by Dr. Johnson. I am sure that Canada would 
also benefit from further efforts to develop its high value exports. 
Export Supply 
Now to the supply side. As burdensome grain surpluses evolved 
in recent years, 
expand storage. 
the first response of producer countries was to 
That was a logical, understandable, and perfectly 
rational move. It isolated some of the surplus from the market, 
thereby avoiding a precipitous decline in world prices. Though 
storage is costly, the trade-off in price maintenance was 
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attractive, particularly since the glut was expected to be only 
temporary. 
Your Minister of Agriculture has stated that he would rather 
store excess production than reduce output. In doing so he made 
the point that Canada was caught short a decade ago and did not 
have enough grain to fill its export orders. Determined not to 
let that happen again, Canada has continued to expand production 
in recent years as global surpluses have mounted. So have most 
other grain producing nations, and until this year u.S. policy has 
encompassed a massive storage program, and only modest efforts at 
curbing production. 
All of us should have given these policies much more 
consideration and much more coordination about a year ago 
when it became apparent that this I1temporary" glut was not so 
shortl i ved. That was the time to respond, before th ings got 
totally out of hand. Now we are "slamming the barn door after the 
horse is out." u.S. farm incomes deteriorated to the point where 
drastic action had to be taken. The U.S. response is encompassed 
in our PIR (payment in kind) program, in which surplus commodities 
are being made available to American farmers as compensation for 
withdrawing more than 80 million acres of land from production in 
1983. The cost of this and other farm program payments will be an 
astonishing $20 billion or so, by far the highest in our history. 
PIK is a popular program with farmers, a successful program in 
achieving acreage reductions, but a costly one that cannot endure 
for long. 
My principal complaint with PIK is that it constitutes a 
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unilateral effort by the United States to reduce farm surpluses. 
The present supply imbalance is a global phenomenon, not an 
American one. It is "global" in the sense that it encompasses the 
universe of agricultural exporting nations, Canada included. For 
the United States to reduce production while other exporting 
nations merrily expand output makes no sense at all. The scenario 
simply represents a transfer of wealth from the American taxpayer 
to the taxpayers of the EEC, Canada, Australia and Argentina. It 
may also reduce our market share in the process. All in all, 
unilateral supply reductions by the U. s. or any other producing 
country are indefensible from a competitive viewpoint. 
The answer is for all major agricultural exporters to share 
this adjustment burden. That ought to be done through discussions 
between and among the agricultural ministers, hopefully achieving 
a consensus as to the contribution each nation would make to the 
(hopefully temporary) supply control cause. That contribution 
might be an expanded storage program, restricted production, or 
both. 
Each of the ministers of agriculture ought then return home 
and carry out his commi tment in his own way. This does not 
necessitate an international grains agreement; I am not a fan of 
international commodi ty agreements of any kind. They have been 
wholesale failures through the years, and there is no need to 
re-invent that faul ty wheel. Furthermore lit is none of our 
business how Canada or any other country achieves its policy 
objectives, or vice versa. What is important is that nations with 
a common problem agree on basic objectives for responding to that 
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problem, make the necessary commitment to respond, and then go 
home and work diligently toward doing so. 
Supply control, storage, and price support schemes are a 
reality in most agricultural nations, and with all their 
shortcomings they are not likely to disappear from the policy 
scene. Tools such as this can be helpful from time to time in 
periods of supply-demand imbalance, and this seems to be one of 
those times. But we should not become dependent upon such 
programs for our agricultural livelihood. Market fundamentals 
still do a far better job of sending production and marketing 
signals to farmers than do government bureaucracies, and we ought 
never forget that. The market also provides that information at a 
whole lot less cost than governments do. 
Productivity 
Finally, everything I have said to you today is of no 
relevance if our farmers are not among the most efficient and 
productive in all the world. If we lose our agricultural 
competitiveness, government policies are essentially meaningless. 
They can provide protection in the short run, and ease the 
transition to other occupations. But they cannot keep our 
agricultural industries in business long term if market 
fundamentals point the other way. Therefore, it is incumbent on 
all of us to help sustain the impressive productivity of American 
and Canadian agriculture. That goal applies to production, 
processing, domestic marketing, and international marketing 
endeavors, and it implies the continued need for effective 
research and extension programs, rapid technology adaptation, a 
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modern agricultural infrastructure, the development of high level 
managerial skills, etc. I mention this subject today only because 
it is fundamental to everything you are doing at this conference. 
The Canaqa-U.S. Relationship 
In closing I wish to say a word about the relationship 
between our two great countries. No one questions the depth of 
our friendship. Canada's support during the Iranian hostage 
crisis was vivid and heartwarming evidence of your affection 
toward your big neighbor to the south. It was a truly magnificent 
gesture. On our part, it is my judgment that Americans feel a 
closer affinity to Canada today than to any other nation. That is 
a fabulous human bond on which to build extensive economic and 
political relationships. 
You Canadians seem to have some trepidation about going too 
far too fast in your economic liaisons with us, and that is 
understandable. You are a strong and vibrant nation in your own 
right, with the sovereign right to establish whatever national 
policies and priorities you wish. Nevertheless, I hope all 
Canadian citizens, including those in this room, will consider the 
long term benefits to Canada of open trade with the United States. 
That is a distant goal, though much progress has already been 
made. But consider the immense economic strength of a pair of 
nations with more than 300 million people, an incredible combined 
GNP, one of the highest per capi ta incomes in the world and, 
agricultural production plants second to none. 
capi talize on these strengths, identify and 
If we can both 
nourish our 
synergisms, and work together on international opportunities of 
common benefit, we shall truly experience "recovery" in the coming 
decade. 
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